Update: I watched the repeat airing of the show this morning, in order to verify the accuracy of the quote dealt with below. The transcript is accurate in the quote. However, it is ascribed to the wrong person. The transcript credits the quote to Barbara Chadwick, Director of Patient Services for Planned Parenthood of East-Central Iowa. Watching the show, I discovered that these words were spoken by Janine Idziak, professor of philosophy at Loras College in Dubuque.
I still think that Ms. Idziak's argument is worth paying attention to. (In fact, she elsewhere contributes good, pro-life comments to the discussion.) So, I've updated this post to accurately reflect the program (and not the erroneous transcript). I must admit that I am disappointed by the transcriber's error. I would have liked very much to think that such lucid pro-life arguments were being made by Planned Parenthood.
Do the rights of “developing fetuses” trump the rights of the mother, the family and society?
The May 24 episode of
Ethical Perspectives on the News dealt with the subject of “Multiple Births and Fertility Clinics.” As I scanned the transcript of the program, the following paragraph caught my attention.
(The full transcript is available here, for now. I have posted the full transcript on my blog, here, and have saved a copy, should it be removed from their website. I am posting the follow paragraph as it appears in the transcript, including misspellings [such as, “non-maleffecence” and “fetusus”] and the all-caps format. It appears that a few words may have been missed by the transcriber. I will attempt to get a video copy of the program. Should I discover missing words, particularly those that change the context significantly, I will adjust the post.):
BARBARA: I APPRECIATE YOUR CONCERN ABOUT SOCIETAL RESOURCES BEING USED TO SUPPORT 14 CHILDREN FROM ONE MOM, BUT I THINK BEYOND THE ISSUE OF THE NUMBER OF CHILDREN A FAMILY HAS IS THE ISSUE OF THE HARM THAT CAN COME BOTH TO THE FETUS AND THE MOTHER IN A MULTI-FETAL PREGNANCY. THAT IS BAD FOR THE DEVELOPING FETUSES IS THAT THEY WILL LIKELY BE BORN PREMATURE, THEY SUFFER DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES. A MULTI-FETAL PREGNANCY CAN ALSO BE HARMFUL TO THE MOTHER IN TERMS OF DEVELOPING HIGH BLOOD PRESSURE AND OTHER PHYSIOLOGICAL CONDITIONS. SO FROM AN ETHICAL POINT OF VIEW I THINK THERE ARE TWO PRINCIPLES THAT ARE RELEVANT HERE: FIRST OF ALL, ON AUTONOMY. THE RIGHT OF THE WOMAN OR THE COUPLE TO DETERMINE THE SIZE OF THEIR FAMILY. BUT BALANCE THAT AGAINST NON-MALEFFECENT, OUR DUTY NOT TO ENGAGE IN ACTIONS WHICH CARRY A SUBSTANTIAL HARM TO OTHER PEOPLE. AND I WOULD ARGUE IN THIS CASE THAT NON-MALEFFECENCE TRUMPS THE AUTONOMY. THAT FIRST AND FOREMOST IS THE CONSIDERATION NOT TO ENGAGE IN MEDICAL, IN ACTIONS, WHICH CARRY SERIOUSNESS OF HARMFUL FOR THE MOTHER AND THE DEVELOPING FETUSUS.
Notice the argument being made and where it leads.
First, concern regarding “harm that can come…to the fetus” is a concern that outweighs the concern for proper use of “societal resources.”
Second, concern regarding “harm that can come…to the fetus” is a concern that outweighs “the issue of the number of children a family has.”
Third, the principle of
nonmaleficence, which she defines as “our duty not to engage in actions which carry a substantial harm to other people,” applies to “fetuses.”
Fourth, the principle of
nonmaleficence “trumps the autonomy,” which is defined to include “the right of the woman or the couple to determine the size of their family.”
Fifth, the principle of
nonmaleficence leads to “the consideration not to engage in medical, in actions, which carry seriousness of harmful for…the developing
fetusus [
sic].” In other words, when a medical action carries serious risk of harm to the fetuses, the principle of
nonmaleficence determines that it ought not to be engaged in.
If this argument is followed consistently, it becomes a significant argument against abortion.
Applying the points of her argument in order to abortion, we must conclude:
First, abortion cannot be justified, in full or in part, by an appeal to the best use of social resources, financial or otherwise. Since concern regarding “harm that can come…to the fetus” outweighs the concern for proper use of “societal resources,” then we may not argue for abortion based on the strain that the “fetus” will put on societal resources if born, whether “unwanted,” “severely disabled,” or otherwise. Apparently, “societal resources,” while an appreciated concern, must be surrendered to the concern to prevent “harm…to the fetus.” Death is the greatest “harm that can come…to the fetus,” and therefore abortion cannot be justified by appealing to “societal resources.”
Second, abortion cannot be justified by appealing to the situation of a family. Since concern regarding “harm that can come…to the fetus” is a concern that outweighs “the issue of the number of children a family has,” the situation of a family is secondary to that of preventing “harm that can come…to the fetus.” Again, death is the greatest “harm that can come…to the fetus,” and therefore abortion cannot be justified by appealing to the negative impact that the birth of the “fetus” will have on the family unit.
Third, abortion cannot be justified by appealing to the status of the “fetus” as that of a non-person. These statements reveal that the status of a “fetus” is that of a “person,” the same as the status of the mother. The principle of
nonmaleficence as “our duty not to engage in actions which carry a substantial harm to other people.” She applies this principle to “developing fetuses,” alongside the “mother.” Thus, she defines “developing fetuses” as “other people.” Death is the greatest “harm that can come…to the fetus,” and therefore abortion cannot be justified by appealing to the standing of the fetus as less than that of a “person.” Just as one would seek prevent harm to, especially the harm of death, to the “mother,” we must equally seek to prevent harm, especially death, to the “developing fetuses.”
(A side-road worth traveling, but which I will forgo, is the discussion of what constitutes a “mother.” Can one be a “mother” without a “child”? And if not, then who is the “child”? And if the child is the “developing fetus,” which it must be in the instances under discussion, then
isn’t the abortion of a “developing fetus” the killing of a mother’s child? And, if a “mother” has the legal right to kill her “child” when it is in the womb eight months prior to birth, why does she not have that right eight months after it has left the womb? Why do we provide surgical procedures to end the life of a child in the womb, but prosecute the mother who ends the life of her child by drowning it in the bathtub? What difference does the location of a child make? Or, for that matter, the developmental level of the child? But, I digress…)
Forth, abortion cannot be justified by appealing to the rights of a woman. Ms.
Idziak clearly states that the principle of “autonomy,” which includes “the right of the woman…to determine the size of [her] family,” is “trumped” by the principle of
nonmaleficence toward the “fetus,” which is a person. The heart of this argument is that the “fetus” is a person who has the right be treated in a way that will do it “no harm,” a right which trumps that of the mother. Death is the greatest “harm that can come…to the fetus.” Only the death of the mother could equal weight of concern due to the death of the fetus. This implies that, except that the development of the fetus necessarily and directly threatens the life of the mother, the well-being of the fetus trumps the rights of the mother. Therefore, abortion cannot be justified by appealing to “women’s rights.”
Fifth, abortion cannot be justified since it necessarily involves the greatest harm possible to the developing fetus—death. It is argued that “the consideration not to engage in medical, in actions, which carry seriousness of harmful for…the developing
fetusus [
sic].” The words are jumbled, but the intent is clear. Serious consideration must be given whenever a medical action will involve or could entail serious harm to the “developing fetuses.” Abortion necessarily involves serious harm to a “fetus,” since abortion ends the life of the “fetus,” to put it mildly. Since, the “fetus” is a person with a right to be treated according to the principle of
nonmaleficence, a right that trumps the autonomy of the mother, the autonomy of the family, the impact on the family and concern for societal resources, aside from an equally weighty
nonmaleficence concern on the part of the mother (the death of the mother), abortion cannot be justified.
Let’s hope that this type of argument and such lines of reasoning not only continue to be made by college professors, but that they are put into action in society!
Thanks to Prof.
Idziak for boldly drawing attention to this concern for fetal-rights. May unborn persons soon be granted the right to be treated by the principle of
nonmaleficence!